The state-sanctioned Hashd al-Shaabi, the term given to the mass mobilization of volunteers to repel the Islamic State, embodies the most serious defense of Shia-centric state building as of late 2015. The spread of the self-proclaimed Islamic State across much of Iraq in 2014 represents the most extreme form of Sunni rejection. Sectarianization will continue to define Iraqi politics.Sunni opponents of the post-2003 order became as sect-centric as the system they once derided for its Shia-centricity.

The failure of the occupation forces and the new political classes to construct a functioning state that could deliver basic services exacerbated the problem. The necessary will, vision, and political skill to avert the sectarianization of Iraq were absent among Iraqi and U.S. The sectarianization of Iraq was not inevitable, but regime change in 2003 accelerated the empowerment of new and preexisting sect-centric actors.These developments ranged from the homogenizing nation building propagated by successive Iraqi regimes to the rise of a sect-centric Shia opposition in exile. Both Shia-centric state building and Sunni rejection of the post-2003 order are the result of cumulative processes that have unfolded over the course of the twentieth century.The Roots of Iraq’s Sect-Centric Politics As long as violence rages, the mistrust characterizing politics and sectarian relations will persist to the benefit of hardline actors on all sides. Post-2003 politics have been dominated by the competition between sect-centric Shia and Sunni forces as exemplified by the ongoing cycle of Shia-centric state building and Sunni rejection of this state-building project. The clash of visions over the Iraqi state’s identity, legitimacy, and ownership, long predating the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003, has been the root cause of political violence in postwar Arab Iraq. Sources of Sectarianism in the Middle East

Shia islamic calendar 2016